Saturday, 11 July 2009
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By Scripture Alone
By W. Gary Crampton
see relatedThe Logical Coherency of the Intellectual Triunity of God
The following is an essay on the logical coherency of the intellectual Triunity of God. In Simple words: the aim of the article is to demonstrate that the Trinity is not a logical contradiction as some have claimed, but a necessary, biblical and logical concept. The article is a bit long, but I hope you enjoy it. On Gordon H Clark's work on the Trinity. (Footnotes at the bottom)
The Logical Coherency of the Intellectual Triunity of God
Trinitarian Terminology: Confusion
The logical coherency of the Trinity is perhaps one of less understood concepts in Christianity. Yet it is an essential doctrine of orthodox Christian belief relating to almost every area of theology, especially its implications surrounding the atonement[1], which makes it a criterion of orthodoxy. Part of this theological vacuum has to do with poor definitions of terms throughout church history on top of a theological concept that is impossible for the human mind to comprehend fully. Rahner states it well when he said that,
“Christians, for all their orthodox profession of faith in the Trinity, are almost just 'monotheist' in their actual religious experience. One might almost dare to affirm that if the doctrine of the Trinity were to be erased as false, most religious literature could be preserved almost unchanged throughout the process”[2].
This paper examines the Trinity specifically to examine the logical coherency of the Trinity and demonstrate why it is not unreasonable to believe that God can be one Godhead/being and three persons at the same time, without being “schizophrenic”.
To begin with, we need to clear some confusion over terms. In the Greek, The Godhead is one ousia (being, reality, essence) with three upostaseis[3]. The Latin theologians, translated upostasis as persona, and ousia as substantia. Hence in English, we often say that God is one substance in three persons, while in the literal Greek translation, it is one reality and three substances[4].
Greek: One Being/reality (ousia) Three Substances (upostaseis)
English and Latin: One Substance Three persons
Augustine: One Essence/Substances/Nature Three persons
Thomas Watson[5] One Godhead/Essence Three persons/substance
Van Til One person Three Persons
Clark explains that even Calvin was confused by the use of the word upostaseis when he mentions “Jerome’s rejection of three substances”[6], while Hilary more than a hundred times mentioned that there are three substances (upostaseis) in the Godhead. Augustine (~three centuries before Athanasius), in De Doctrina Christiana (V,8), defines ousia as essence[7], but in VII, ii,3, he synonymously calls it substance. Later on, in VII, iv, 7, he calls it nature twice, while in Chapter V, he concludes that God is not a substance but an essence – though earlier he had made these terms synonymous[8]. Thomas Watson, defines the Trinity as both One Essence and Three Substance and One Godhead and Three persons[9].
If that were not enough, in the last century, Cornelius Van Til went as far as to say that God is One Person and Three Persons, and a one-conscious being and tri-conscious being[10] – a position Gordon Clark was quick to call heretical[11]. John Frame however, claims that it is not heretic as Van Til understood that the One person is not exactly similar In every aspect as the Three persons. But if Van Til understood the one person and the three person differently, then one wonders why he insisted on modifying the traditional definition of One Godhead/being in three persons. Frame reasons that being implies a non-personal entity[12], but stops short of demonstrating how this is so. Furthermore, when asked how his understanding of one person and three persons differ, Frame “excuses himself from the responsibility to answer”[13] , saying that "Scripture itself often fails to be precise about the mysteries of the faith"[14]. Despite Frame’s defense, it seems that Van Til has not added much to the historical understanding with his equivocal usage of “one person and three persons” but rather adds unnecessary confusion to the already complicated use of terms.
While there is much confusion over the historical use of terminology, we can see a general understanding that God is one in a certain sense and three in another sense. To avoid confusion over semantics, in this paper, the Trinity simply would be addressed as One Godhead/being/nature in three persons.
Now that we have defined the terms used to describe the Trinity, we can move on to the second step, which is to examine whether the concept of the Trinity is a logical contradiction, and whether a solution can be reached in understanding how God can be both One being in three persons.
The Trinity
The Trinity can be summarized in three major points:
1. One God who is immutable,” eternally indivisible[15] and simple[16]” (Deut 6:4; John 17:3) – A denial implies Tritheism.
2. “The Father, The Son, and the Holy Spirit are fully God and co-equally God[17]” (John 20:17; John 1:1; Acts 5:3-5) – A denial implies Subordinationism.
3. “The father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct” and not one and the same. (Mark 1:10-11; John 15:26; Hebrews 9:14)”[18] – A Denial implies Modalism.
There are three ways we can go about dealing with these verses. First, we can deny any one of the three concepts – which would lead to heresy. Second, we could accept the above three propositions as a contradiction, yet equally true at the same time. But such a conclusion is not possible unless we deny biblical inerrancy, as inerrancy presupposes that a real contradiction cannot occur in scripture[19]. A third alternative, and the reasonable one, is to recognize our lack of understanding of the Trinity and to “find a resolution allowing us to consistently maintain all three truths[20]”. “While the Trinity is still a matter of faith, its coherence is open to rational examination.[21]” These are important questions every Christian must consider, for the way we understand what constitutes “personhood” in the Trinity will determine if we are within the bounds of orthodoxy.
Unlike Van Til and Frame, who hide behind the curtain of the “Incomprehensibility of God” as an excuse not to explain how the three differ from the one, we ought to seek to present a convincing case that preserves the three Trinitarian affirmations. For example, just saying that God is three persons and one divine nature, if unqualified, can imply Tritheism, depending on who defines it. At first glance, a more plausible solution to Van Til’s conclusion can be derived from an application of Plato’s “Third man” philosophy, which supposes that the Godhead is a fourth person. Plato held that acts of imperfect justice, “presuppose a real Justice in the Ideal world”. Imperfect changing men, are men because they participate in the eternal immutable reality of the Ideal Man[22]. Applying this to the Trinity, one could argue that the three Persons” presuppose a higher Person than the three” [23]
The shortcoming of this explanation however, stems from the fact, that Plato’s argument involves mutable entities that are reflections of an immutable entity. But the persons of the Trinity are not mutable. They are eternal, immutable beings; therefore, nothing higher than the three can be conceivable. Thus, Plato’s analogy fails as a suitable analogical model for the Trinity. Secondly, Plato’s philosophy, unlike Augustine, is not based upon truths revealed in scriptures, but pure abstract ideologies[24]. “God is not an abstraction[25]”, but has revealed truths about His Triune Nature that we can glean from scripture. The propositions used in theological discourse, must therefore have its axioms derived from scripture and not purely founded upon human speculations.
Intellectual Triunity of God
Gordon Clark presents an interesting solution to the Trinity by defining a person as a ‘set of thoughts’ – “A man is what he thinks”. Pro 23:7a (KJV) states that “as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he[26]” and John 1:1 – Christ, the image of God is also understood as the divine mind and wisdom (Logos) incarnate.
Joel Parkinson prefers the phrase, “A man is how he thinks[27]”, Parkinson writes,
“I do not cease to be Joel Parkinson when I learn something new nor do I become someone else when my memory fails me. Yet concerning God, such a subtlety is irrelevant. His thoughts are all encompassing and immutable. Therefore, how God thinks and what He thinks are one and the same.”[28]
This is somewhat similar to Rene Descartes’ “I think, therefore I exist”, where a person that thinks, must necessarily be an existing being.
Some object to this definition of persons. Barth, for example, downplay the importance of this identification of Persons saying that,
“everything depends on the statement that God is the One who loves, and nothing depends on the statement that he is a person. The personality of God, unknown to the Bible and the Reformers, emerged as a battlecry only in modern controversy. Taken by itself, it does not say the right thing it is meant to say… but we can have no essential interest in the modern debate centered on this concept… In preaching nothing is to be gained by this concept, and nothing lost… What will then be proclaimed is not that God is a person, but the particular person he is… the concept “persons” should be dropped... because in all classical theology it has never in fact been understood and interpreted in the sense in which we are accustomed to think of the term today. The Christian Church has never taught that there are in God three persons and therefore three personalities in the sense of a threefold Ego, a threefold Subject. This would be Tritheism.”[29]
But this concept of Person as a thinking being was not drawn from Descartes or “Enlightenment Philosophy” as often claimed, but based upon the foundation of Augustinian understanding that the Trinity is three divine persons, within a single being – the mind/the conscious Ego[30]. While many have progressed beyond Augustine, the underlying concept of the Trinitarian God, according to Augustine[31], is love; and love is relational. The Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit[32]. The relationship within the Trinity can be understood as a loving relationship and communion between the persons of the Trinity. Since God is love, and love is always relational, it requires an object of love other than itself. The Trinity must therefore be a plurality of persons[33]. Likewise, St Basil and the Cappadocians understood the unity of God as a communion of three persons[34]. Like Augustine’s Trinity, God can have personal relationships, a will, knowledge of Himself, memory, and understanding. In this, Barth is certainly correct when he says that “Love is God, the highest law and the ultimate reality[35]”. However, at its most foundational level, this loving entity must first be a thinking being, if it is to be considered a person. A non-thinking being cannot love. In my term paper for Theology 1, 2008, entitled Imago Dei,[36] I established that the image of God in man: man’s personhood, is seen in man being a rational, thinking entity. But if man’s image and personhood is rationality, then the person he is an image of, God, must likewise, be a rational entity.
Augustine was not the only Early Church Authority that spoke of a rational mind. A. Boethius (circa 475-525 CE) spoke of "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia). Thomas Aquinas contends that the term "person" in the Godhead refers to "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as we qualify what is meant by "individual" (i.e. incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual) and "substance" ('self-grounded existing') – God is ipsum esse: a self-subsistent being. Aquinas even go as far as to link the omnipotence of God to the logical coherency of all truths (which would include the Trinity). He writes,
“Everything that does not imply a contradiction is numbered among those possible in respect of which God is called omnipotent; whereas whatever implies a contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it counts against his omnipotence… As we cannot say how a non-logical world would look, we cannot say how a supralogical God would act or how He would communicate anything to us by way of revelation.“[37]
Richard of St. Victor, defines persons as “an incommunicable existence of the divine nature”, and have characteristics that distinguishes them from other persons.[38]
Clark’s solution, which will be the position taken by this paper, views God as an intellectual Triunity. Clark explains that the three divine persons are distinct from each other due to their differing thoughts, for if they shared exactly the same set of thoughts, they would be one person, not three. Clark writes,
“Naturally, human beings are mutable: Their thoughts or mind change. The three Persons of the Godhead are immutable because their thoughts never change. They never forget what they now know, they never learn something new, in fact they have never learned anything. Their thoughts are eternal. Since also the three persons do not have precisely the same set of thoughts, they are not one person, but three.”[39]
Clark is careful, however, to emphasize that each person of the Trinity is still omniscient. (1 John 3:20; Matt 11:27; 1 Cor 2:11) – even if they have a different set of thoughts.
How is this possible? Clark divides knowledge into two categories: objective knowledge and the subjective thoughts[40].
By objective knowledge, Clark is referring to facts that are true regardless of one’s personal experience. E.g. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit know all truths. All three persons of the Trinity know equally well that Jesus will die/have died on the cross, and that the Holy Spirit indwells all believers.
By subjective thoughts, Clark is referring to personal experiential facts. E.g. Only the Son can say that He will, or have died on the cross. The Father cannot make that statement (though He omnisciently knows it). Likewise, only the Holy Spirit can say that He indwells Christians, not the Father, nor the Son.
It must be added that God does not know or learn anything due to His experience, since his knowledge is timeless and immutable. But based on the terms subjective thoughts and objective knowledge we can “distinguish between the first and third persons propositions[41]” of the Trinity. That is, the subjective thoughts distinguish one person of the Trinity from the other, even though their objective knowledge is co-equal and shared completely. The Trinity, according to Clark, can be understood as Three subjective thoughts, and one objective knowledge – a term he coined as the “Intellectual Triunity of God”.
This view is not without its critics though. For example, Cyril Richardson, (like Barth[42]) wrote that “if there are three centers of consciousness in God, there are three gods; no matter in what way we try to state their unity… they are still three”[43]. John O’Donnell even claims that Clark is guilty of advocating Tritheism[44].
Does this charge of Tritheism carry any weight? For Clark to be advocating Tritheism, the Trinity must be understood as three separable and distinguishable gods[45]. One person must be able to exist apart from the other two without affecting the “godness” of the others. But Clark’s three omniscient Persons cannot be divided nor separated. Clark defends the inseparability of the Trinitarian persons, this way[46]:
1. Omniscience by definition means knowledge of all truths – past, present and future. Grudem defines “God fully knows himself and all things actual and possible in one simple and eternal act”.[47]
2. God is omniscient (Isa 46:10; Heb 4:13; 1 John 3:20) and knows all truths; even those in the future. Scriptures is clear that God even foreknows the words (Ps 139:4) and sins of men (Deut 31:21; Jer 18:12; Acts 4:26). To accept the Bible as Truth would require accepting the complete omniscience of God, past, present and future. (Some, such as Open Theists[48] would probably object to this, but space does not allow further discussion of Open Theism here)
3. God is immutable (Ps 102:27; Mal 3:6; Jas 1:17; Heb 13:8)
4. This follows that if God is to be immutable and omniscient; he has to be immutably omniscient. (Premise 2 and 3) If God can learn something new in violation of his immutability, he would not have previously known all things, and thus cannot be omniscient.
5. One Omniscient Person would require knowledge of the thoughts of the other omniscient Persons. E.g. If the Son does not know the father’s thoughts completely, He would not know all things.
6. This detailed inter-personal knowledge must exist within the Godhead, since the Three Persons are God, and God is omniscient. (Matt 11:27; 1 Cor 2:11; 1 Cor 2:10)
7. For this to be true, severability among the three Persons is impossible. “If there were to be a rift within the Godhead, then each of the Persons could no longer immediately know the thoughts of the others. But this could only occur if these thoughts were never known, or if they were to forget something (A denial of their immutable omniscience)
Therefore, we can see that divine omniscience is possible for the Three Persons only if they are inseparable, or we will face a metaphysical impossibility[49]. The Persons can never be conceived of “apart from their consubstantiality, nor can their common Essence ever be conceived of except as the consubstantiality of the Persons”[50]. Clark therefore, cannot be guilty of Tritheism, because his concept of the trinity does not allow one person of the trinity to exist apart from the other.
Why and how are the three Persons in the Godhead omniscient? To this, Clark replies that a Christian is not obliged to explain why or how God exists as he does[51]. All a Christian has to do, is to demonstrate the internal consistency of what God has revealed to men in the Bible. God is an eternal reality, and to point to any reason why he is as he is, “would imply something beyond God and empty Him of His sovereign self-existence.[52]” While it is may remain impossible for us to completely comprehend how God can be Three Persons in one Godhead, this paper simply seeks to demonstrate the logical coherency of the intellectual Triunity, not to imagine this Triunity. In fact, that is one reason why the second commandment forbids images of God[53]. Timothy Ware quotes Vladimir Lossky,
"The dogma of the Trinity is a cross for human ways of thought... No philosophical speculation has ever succeeded in rising to the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Yet as Dom Illtyd Trethowan says, "a ‘mystery’, in the proper theological sense, is something revealed for our understanding... but which we never understand exhaustively, because it leads into the darkness of God”[54].
What we can do, however, is to demonstrate that the doctrine of the trinity is a rational doctrine; and one that skeptics cannot accuse of being a logical contradiction.
Conclusion
In Conclusion, The intellectual Triunity of God is a logical concept, where the three subjective thoughts of the Godhead cannot be reduced to one personality. We also see that there is one common body of objective knowledge to the three persons who is equally immutably omniscient. This equally shared omniscient content means that the three Persons are inseparable from each other, for if there is a rift between one Person and another, God cannot be immutably omniscient (Proposition 7 above). Since they are indivisible[55], they are one God. The Intellectual Triunity is therefore not guilty of Tritheism. Secondly, since there are three different subjective thoughts and not mere modes of one person, it escapes the charge of Modalism. Third, since there is one “immutable omniscience” equally shared by all three persons of the Godhead, it avoids the heresy of Subordination , Arianism, and Monarchianism[56]. Clark’s Intellectual Triunity successfully demonstrates the logical coherency of the Trinity without confounding the persons or the Godhead, and successfully demonstrates that the trinity is not a logical contradiction.
Biography
Clark, G. H. (1988). The incarnation. Jefferson, Md., Trinity Foundation.
Clark, G. H. (1990). The Trinity. Jefferson, Md. (P.O. Box 169, Jefferson 21755), Trinity Foundation.
Clark, G. H. (1997). Karl Barth's theological method. Hobbs, N.M., Trinity Foundation.
Crampton, G. (2003). "A review of: Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of his Thought."
Erickson, M. J. (2007). Christian theology. Grand Rapids, Mich., Baker Book House.
Foster, E. (March 20, 2008). The Trinity Doctrine and Personhood, An Outline, Foster's Theological Reflections.
Frame, J. M. and C. Van Til (1995). Cornelius Van Til : an analysis of his thought. Phillipsburg, N.J., P&R Pub.
Grudem, W. A. and J. Purswell (2004). Bible doctrine : essential teachings of the Christian faith. Grand Rapids, Mich., Zondervan.
Nash, R. H. (1999). Life's ultimate questions : an introduction to philosophy. Grand Rapids, MI, Zondervan Publishing House.
O'Donnell, J. J. (1989). The mystery of the triune God. New York, Paulist Press.
Owen, J., K. M. Kapic, et al. (2007). Communion with the Triune God. Wheaton, Ill., Crossway Books.
Rahner, K. (1966). Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Deo", Theological
Investigations, Vol, iv. London
Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, T. Nelson.
Richardson, C. C. (1958). The doctrine of the Trinity. New York,, Abingdon Press.
Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
Tay, J. (2008). "Imago Dei."
http://philosophyofjoel.xanga.com/691101348/what-is-the-image-of-god-in-man/
Van Til, C. and K. Barth (1962). Christianity and Barthianism. Philadelphia,, Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co.
Van Til, C. and W. Edgar (2007). An introduction to systematic theology : prolegomena and the doctrines of revelation, scripture, and God. Phillipsburg, N.J., P&R Pub.
Ware, T. The human person as an Icon of the Trinity
http://www.unionwithchrist.com/human%20person.pdf
Zizioulas, J. (1985). Being as communion : studies in personhood and the church. Crestwood, N.Y., St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.
[1] Grudem, W. A. and J. Purswell (2004). Bible doctrine : essential teachings of the Christian faith. Grand Rapids, Mich., Zondervan.
p.115
[2] Rahner, K. (1966). Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Deo", Theological
Investigations, Vol, iv. London
p.79
[3] Clark, G. H. (1990). The Trinity. Jefferson, Md. (P.O. Box 169, Jefferson 21755), Trinity Foundation.
p.42
[4] Ibid.
p.44
[6] Clark, G. H. (1990). The Trinity. Jefferson, Md. (P.O. Box 169, Jefferson 21755), Trinity Foundation.
p.44
[7] Ibid.
p.49
[8] Ibid.
p.53
[9] Ibid.
p.51
[10] Van Til, C. and W. Edgar (2007). An introduction to systematic theology : prolegomena and the doctrines of revelation, scripture, and God. Phillipsburg, N.J., P&R Pub.
p.220
[11] Crampton, G. (2003). "A review of: Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of his Thought."
p.2
[12] Frame, J. M. and C. Van Til (1995). Cornelius Van Til : an analysis of his thought. Phillipsburg, N.J., P&R Pub.
p.69
[13] Ibid.
p.69
[14] Ibid.
p.69
[15] Owen, J., K. M. Kapic, et al. (2007). Communion with the Triune God. Wheaton, Ill., Crossway Books.
p.24
[16] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.119
[17] Ibid.
p.119
[18] Ibid.
p.119
[19] Ibid.
p.81
[20] Ibid.
p.119
[21] Ibid.
p.119
[23] Clark, G. H. (1990). The Trinity. Jefferson, Md. (P.O. Box 169, Jefferson 21755), Trinity Foundation.
p.1007-106
[24] Ibid.
p.109
[25] Ware, T. The human person as an Icon of the Trinity
p.2
[26] Clark, G. H. (1988). The incarnation. Jefferson, Md., Trinity Foundation.
p.64
[27] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.120
[28] Ibid.
p.120
[29] Clark, G. H. (1997). Karl Barth's theological method. Hobbs, N.M., Trinity Foundation.
p.42-43
[30] Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, T. Nelson.
p.319
[31] Erickson, M. J. (2007). Christian theology. Grand Rapids, Mich., Baker Book House.
p.365
[32] Ware, T. The human person as an Icon of the Trinity
p.3-4
http://www.unionwithchrist.com/human%20person.pdf
[34] Zizioulas, J. (1985). Being as communion : studies in personhood and the church. Crestwood, N.Y., St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.
p.135
[35] Van Til, C. and K. Barth (1962). Christianity and Barthianism. Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co.
p.36
[36] Tay, J. (2008). "Imago Dei."
http://philosophyofjoel.xanga.com/691101348/what-is-the-image-of-god-in-man/
[37] Nash, R. H. (1999). Life's ultimate questions : an introduction to philosophy. Grand Rapids, MI, Zondervan Publishing House.
p.309-310
[38] Foster, E. (March 20, 2008). The Trinity Doctrine and Personhood, An Outline, Foster's Theological Reflections.
http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2008/03/trinity-doctrine-and-personhood-outline.html
[39] Clark, G. H. (1990). The Trinity. Jefferson, Md. (P.O. Box 169, Jefferson 21755), Trinity Foundation.
p.106-107
[40] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.120
[41] Ibid.
p.120
[42] Clark, G. H. (1997). Karl Barth's theological method. Hobbs, N.M., Trinity Foundation.
p.43
[43] Richardson, C. C. (1958). The doctrine of the Trinity. New York,, Abingdon Press.
p.94
[44] O'Donnell, J. J. (1989). The mystery of the triune God. New York, Paulist Press.
p.103
[45] Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, T. Nelson.
p.323
[46] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.120
[47] Grudem, W. A. and J. Purswell (2004). Bible doctrine : essential teachings of the Christian faith. Grand Rapids, Mich., Zondervan.
p.88
[48] Nash, R. H. (1999). Life's ultimate questions : an introduction to philosophy. Grand Rapids, MI, Zondervan Publishing House.
p.317-325
[49] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.121
[50] Foster, E. (March 20, 2008). The Trinity Doctrine and Personhood, An Outline, Foster's Theological Reflections.
http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2008/03/trinity-doctrine-and-personhood-outline.html
[51] Robbins, J. W. and G. H. Clark (2002). Against the churches : the Trinity review, 1989-1998. Unicoi, Tenn., Trinity Foundation.
p.121
[52] Ibid.
p.121
[53] Ibid.
p.121
[54] Ware, T. The human person as an Icon of the Trinity
p.2
[55] Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, T. Nelson.
p.321
[56] Erickson, M. J. (2007). Christian theology. Grand Rapids, Mich., Baker Book House.
p.358-360
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Comments (9)
Interesting article but all in all, the trinity is still a mystery. Right now we see through a glass darkly, but one day face to face.
Here's a question about the Clark vs Van-Til debate: could Van-Til be classified as a Hyper-Calvinist?
Based on my limited knowledge, Van-Til's apologetics is a response that in light of Total Depravity, the more "classical" and "Thomistic" approaches to apologetics are faulty on the grounds that they do not address the fact that fallen man cannot truly grasp the things of God (based on 1Cor2 I would agree initially), yet even for the regenerate, God still speaks to people at the human level rather than direct, actual revelation (which Clark contends as being the real means by which man knows God); the former leading to "Incomprehensebility", neo-orthodoxy and sadly, agnosticism (though is that what Van-til intended?)
If seems that Clark's view of human depravity is more closer to Romans 1:18-32 in the sense of God openly revealing himself only to have man turn away as opposed to saying that God is completely unknowable in any manner.
@Prayer_Warrior83 -
Hi Prayer_warrior,
Van Til is not only not a hyper-calvinist,
he is not even a calvinist by historical standards. He holds to the
idea of the "free will offer" and he is very much responsible for the
spread of "common salvafic grace" teaching in the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church (and Westminster Thelogical Seminary where Van Til taught). This
teaching has pretty much spread to many "reformed" circles since.
Common Salvafic Grace is coined by Daniel to refer to this teaching where they believe that "common grace actually refers to a favorable and gracious operation of
the Holy Spirit which includes a desire for the salvation of all Man".
Read these two excellent article: here and here that deals with it.
Van
Til's understanding of paradox and knowledge is dangerously similar
Karl Barth's Neo-orthodox understanding. He believes that there is no
univocal (no identical) point of similarity between man's knowledge and
God's knowledge. Van Til teach that we only know an analogy. God's
knowledge is both quantitatively and qualitatively difference from man.
That is why Van Til (and Frame) says he cannot know if 2 + 2 = 4 for
God. Because to say that 2 + 2 = 4 for God, he would first need to have
univocal knowledge.
Clark
believe that man's knowledge is qualitatively univocal but
quantitatively less than God) He points out that an analogy demands
that there is univocal similarity at some point - otherwise, it cannot
be an analogy, but becomes equivocal. (completely different) Also, if
all that God knows is true, and if there is no univocal qualitative
similarity in man's knowledge and God's knowledge, then man cannot know
ANY truth. Such a person cannot even know he cannot know ANY truth.
There is a further problem with Van Til saying that he cannot know if 2 + 2 = 4 for God.
Does God knows that Van Til believe "we cannot know if 2 + 2 = 4 for God"?
If
God knows exactly the way that "Van Til believe God cannot know 2 + 2 =
4", doesn't that bring us back to one univocal point of knowledge
between man and God? Namely, that God and Van Til both know how "Van
Til believe that he cannot know if 2 + 2 = 4 for God".
Van Til's
theology is terribly mixed up and seld-defeating. You are right in
saying that his view brought to its conclusion... leads to Agnosticism
and Neo-orthodoxy.
But I do not think that he can be classified
as a Hyper-calvinist, especially since he does not even accept
historical reformed Calvinism. He is more Neo-Calvinistic in that
aspect.
@PhilosophyOfJoel -
Actually, I would restrict the labels of "Calvinist", "hyper-Calvinist" et al to soteriological categories, not epistemological categories. As such, I do not think Van Til can be called Reformed, but can be called "Calvinist" in a certain sense.
Hmmm.... I would rather say that a person is "an ontologcally separate being who thinks", rather than just "a set of thoughts".
No debate that personhood is understood as "an ontologcially separate being who thinks". But what is an ontologically separate being?
Isn't it one who thinks? And isn't one who thinks an onotologically separate being?
@PhilosophyOfJoel -
well, yes. But shouldn't we not conflate the categories of Ontology and Epistemology?
@Daniel Chew - Would you therefore define the persons of the Trinity as three ontologically separate beings? Or three ontologically inseparable beings?
@PhilosophyOfJoel - I would think that the persons of the Trinity are three ontologically separate beings who are ontologically inter-dependent on each other, possessing all attributes in common objectively as God. With regards to knowledge, I think Clark's view on the objective/subjective possession of knowledge in the Trinity sounds right.